We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers repeatedly compete for the opportunity to trade with short-lived retail traders. We characterize equilibria in which dealers' pricing strategies are optimal irrespective of the private information that each dealer may possess. Thus, our model's predictions are robust to different specifications of the dealers' information structure. These equilibria reconcile, in a unified and parsimonious framework, price dynamics that are reminiscent of well-known stylized facts: excess price volatility, price to trading flow correlation, stochastic volatility and inventory-related trading.
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market participants (traders). We characterize price formation equilibria that are robust to all possible specifications of information asymmetries across dealers, irrespective of how simple or complex these asymmetries could be. We show that these equilibria can explain, in a single parsimonious model, a number of well-known stylized facts concerning stock price dynamics. Since Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) , one of the most common assumptions in the financial market microstructure literature is that the equilibrium price of an asset results from Bertrand competition among dealers, who share identical information about the asset fundamentals and the motivation that leads a trader to supply or demand the asset. While the assumption of equally uninformed dealers leads to tractable models, little is known about the equilibrium price dynamics if this assumption is dropped. This is an important issue for two reasons. First, because actual dealers have access to different sources of information, they are unlikely to possess https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.004 0304-405X/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JID: FINEC [m3Gdc; December 1, 2017; 15:10 ] identical information ( Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara, 2002 ) . Second, because information asymmetries are not directly observable, assess the extent to which a model's informational assumptions capture real-life situations is impossible.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
We take an agnostic approach concerning the dealers' information and knowledge. Instead of specifying an ad hoc information structure and then solving for an equilibrium, we characterize dealers' strategies that form an equilibrium irrespective of each dealer's information and beliefs about the fundamentals of the economy. That is, we make virtually no assumption about whether and how dealers are asymmetrically informed. We will refer to these equilibria as belief-free equilibria (henceforth, BFE). 1 Our approach is particularly suited to certain markets, such as the bond market. At any time, each dealer could have some private information about the motivations of his clients. This translates into private information concerning the bond's fundamental value. When setting his public quotes, each dealer takes his own private information into account. Because different dealers have access to different pieces of information, observing his competitors' quotes further affects a dealer's beliefs about the bond's value. In a dynamic setting, in which the same dealers repeatedly meet over time, a dealer's quotes affect not only the dealer's current profit but also his competitors' beliefs. These quotes alter his competitors' future behavior and, hence, the dealer's future profits. Assuming that dealers are uninformed does not fit such markets. The standard approach requires specifying dealers' information structure and solving for a Bayesian equilibrium given this structure. Unfortunately, except for very simple information structures, this approach leads to intractable models. 2 Moreover, nothing guarantees that the equilibrium strategy computed for a hypothetical information structure remains an equilibrium if the actual information structure is different. By contrast, in a BFE, each dealer's strategy is ex post optimal, i.e., independent of the actual fundamental value of the bond. Ex post optimality guarantees that, no matter the dealers' information structure and their beliefs, the strategy profile remains optimal and forms a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the underlying complete information game. A BFE remains an equilibrium even in those markets in which private information differs across dealers and varies over time. In addition, a BFE also remains a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under the informational assumption that dealers themselves are agnostic with respect to other dealers' beliefs about fundamentals. That is, in a BFE, to find the optimal quoting strategy, dealers merely need to follow a simple Markovian mapping from the public history of quotes and trades. Because this mapping is independent of the true asset value, in such equilibria, knowing what other dealers believe is neither necessary nor useful to maximize a dealer's profit.
We first illustrate the mechanism behind BFE within the framework of a Glosten and Milgrom economy. A finite number of long-lived risk-neutral dealers make a market for a population of short-lived mean-variance traders. W . The purpose is to focus on BFE that are as tractable as the standard zero-profit equilibrium. To this purpose, first we characterize five necessary conditions that a price formation strategy must satisfy to form a BFE.
(1) Because a BFE must be an equilibrium even when dealers are uninformed, dealers' strategies must be measurable with respect to the public information, namely, the information that results from the observation of the traders' order flow ( Lemma 3 ). (2) Each dealer can always guarantee zero profit by abstaining from trade. Thus, in every BFE and regardless of the asset true value, each dealer makes strictly positive profit over time. That is, dealers can lose money in the short run, but their average longrun profit must be strictly positive, independently of the asset value ˜ W ( Lemma 4 ). (3) Because no large inventory comes at zero cost, a large inventory necessarily translates into a negative profit, under certain beliefs regarding asset fundamentals. To guarantee that, no matter what a dealer's believes about ˜ W , the dealer expects to make a positive profit, in every BFE, dealers maintain balanced inventories even if they are riskneutral. In other words, dealers' inventories are mean-reverting. The smaller the average trading volume and the larger the residual uncertainty concerning the asset value, the tighter are the bounds on dealers' inventories ( Lemma 5 ). (4) In a BFE, and even if market participants are truly Bayesian, equilibrium quotes cannot reflect Bayesian beliefs about fundamentals. That is, price sensitivity to trading volume does not fade as public information accumulates. Thus, long-term price volatility remains large even without exogenous shocks to fundamentals ( Lemma 7 ). (5) Although price volatility does not decline over time, most trading occurs at quotes that are close to ˜ v , the expected asset value after aggregating traders' private information ( Lemma 6 ). This, together with necessary condition (4), implies that quotes recurrently diverge from the fundamental value of the asset.
Second, we show that, if dealers are patient, the following Markov strategy for dealers forms a BFE. In essence, the strategy has two components, which correspond to exploring and exploiting phases. Exploring phases are periods in which dealers' quotes are set to probe traders' demand to learn ˜ v , that is, what traders know about the true asset value. Exploiting phases are periods in which dealers exploit the information from the exploring phases and make
